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Abstract: 
In recent years greater numbers of thinkers have considered the Prisoners' Counsel Act 
1836 but have viewed the Act through the lens of Whig history, as a further manifestation of 
the modernisation of criminal justice in the inevitable march towards adversarialism. This 
article addresses how the Act has been understood within broader literature concerning the 
nineteenth century felony trial. In particular, greater attention is paid to how counsel reacted 
to the Act, considering the nature of the contemporary Bar, the apparent silence from the Bar 
in reaction to the Act, what evidence might be drawn upon to gauge how members of the Bar 
might have reacted to changes within the trial and some possible explanation for such 
reactions. Lastly, some conclusions are drawn as to what these reactions reveal about 
pervading perceptions of the Bar during the mid-nineteenth century.  
 




The Prisoners' Counsel Act 1836 (hereafter, the Act) was arguably the most significant 
development in criminal trial procedure during the nineteenth century. 2  The Act gave 
prisoners in felony trials the right to delegate the presentation of their defence to professional 
counsel. Prior to this alteration prisoners could only rely on advocates to examine and cross 
examine witnesses and this was at the discretion of the trial judge. Should the prisoner have 
wished to put forward any defence to the court by way of an explanation or coherent 
narrative, they could only do this personally in a system labelled by John Langbein as the 
‘Accused speaks’ trial. 3  Such a trial relied almost exclusively upon the prisoner for an 
explanation of any possible defence. By forcing the prisoner to address the court, it was 
believed that the innocent accused was in the best position to demonstrate their innocence 
to the court.4 Theoretically, this was a genuinely truth-seeking measure but in reality, the 
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terrified, inarticulate or mentally less adroit prisoner was rarely able to offer the court any 
information beyond pleading for mercy, whether they had committed the offence or not.5  
 
The Act was not solely the codification of the right for prisoners to have defence counsel, it 
was a political and cultural signal that defence counsel were a permanent fixture of the 
felony trial and the previous judicial discretion which allowed counsel to pave their way in 
trials was at an end; defence counsel were now a right and not a privilege.6 Consequently, 
the Act itself deserves significant academic attention as it represents a definitive shift in the 
felony trial, beyond that of merely consolidating trial practice.  
This article addresses how the Act has been understood within broader literature concerning 
the nineteenth century felony trial. In particular, greater attention is paid to how counsel 
reacted to the Act, looking in particular at the nature of the contemporary Bar, the apparent 
silence from the Bar in reaction to the Act, what evidence might be drawn upon to gauge 
how members of the Bar might have reacted to changes within the trial and some possible 
explanation for such reactions. Lastly, some conclusions will be drawn about what these 
reactions might tell us about pervading perceptions of the Bar during the mid-nineteenth 
century.  
 
1 Current Literature 
The Act has largely been explored within a framework of Whig history.7 This framework 
assumes a progression toward greater constitutional freedoms and in the context of legal 
procedure, Whiggism might then be characterised as a march towards a triumphant 
adversarialism and all that might entail, or as a further manifestation of the modernisation of 
criminal justice. This approach presupposes a particular development of the felony trial and 
the modern day adversarial system to be the logical or foreseeable consequence of the 
debates surrounding felony reform during the nineteenth century; a development from one 
paradigm towards what is regarded by the Whigs as a better paradigm. Whilst this approach 
has yielded some excellent research, at times this deterministic thinking prevents 
consideration of alternative developments.8 This alternative approach not only reveals an 
underside to legal history, but to our understanding of where the adversarial trial ought to be 
situated in the modern legal system.  
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The potential flaws of Whig interpretation have previously been addressed by thinkers such 
as David Cairns.9 Cairns has criticised Langbein for taking a deterministic approach to his 
research surrounding the criminal trial but Cairns himself continues to assume the current 
adversarial system to be the natural consequence of the modernised trial. This approach is 
not uncommon in this field and the traditional, pre-reform trial, which limited defence counsel, 
is consistently portrayed as archaic, of its time or unreasoned. By way of contrast, the 
nineteenth century reforms influenced by political and ideological liberal values alongside a 
growing utilitarian ethos, have been understood by many scholars in terms of 
progressiveness and rationalisation of the justice system, which in turn, have led to our 
modern trial.10 This pre-modern trial can be understood as being a product of the Ancien 
Regime, a method of dispute resolution rooted in irrational medieval dogma and, to some 
extent, of course this is true. However, to assume that the system which followed is 
somehow more rational is rather optimistic and an assumption too far. 
 
Moreover, by presupposing the outcome of the events and measures leading to the reforms 
throughout the nineteenth century, there is a danger of analysing these developments from 
too modern a perspective. Too much weight may be placed on the strength of argument 
surrounding the reforms; we should be careful not to assume that argument supporting the 
reforms was made stronger by the nature of the reforms themselves. It is dangerous to 
suppose that proponents of reform were moved by some philosophical zeitgeist as such an 
assumption detracts from the individual motivations behind particular reformers. For instance, 
the right of defence counsel to address the jury is generally held to be essential within the 
modern criminal trial and opinion may have begun to move in this direction during the 
eighteenth century. 11  However, such certainness of what constitutes a ‘fair trial’ and 
moreover, the very necessity for such a trial, has not always existed. To assume that 
reference to defendants’ rights held the same importance historically as it does today is a 
gross misunderstanding of the criminal justice system in the early nineteenth century and 
before.  
 
It is also misleading to think that certain reforms, such as those within the 1836 Act, survived 
public, political and professional scrutiny simply because the reforms were somehow 
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considered to be more logical or rational than the status quo or the alternatives suggested by 
would-be reformers. This is not to argue that some reformers did not consider themselves to 
be rationalising the felony trial but again, their arguments were not couched in terms of 
progress for progress’ sake. The great reformers such as Bentham and Brougham did not 
advocate change, they advocated rational developments which would result in the criminal 
law being more consistent and less reliant upon the mercy of judges and jurors. However, it 
is unhelpful to try to understand why some nineteenth century legal and political reforms 
were successful without fully addressing the cultural context within which such reforms were 
made. A fuller understanding of this key moment in the history of common law adversarialism 
might be reached by taking into account the cultural context and its role in shaping the 
reforming agenda. Any political or legal reform must be understood in an intellectual or 
cultural context and it would be misleading to think of the reforms of the felony trial as being 
designed to achieve only one end such as the perceived improvement to the rights of the 
prisoner. Martin J. Wiener approaches this challenge by utilising a dialectic of 
historiographical orientations: internalism and pragmatism with internalists defined as 
viewing legal history as a phenomenon which should be considered as unique and only 
understandable within a logic of legal history. In contrast, Wiener argues pragmatists take a 
more interdisciplinary approach. Wiener places scholars such as Langbein, with his criticism 
of Douglas Hay’s Albion’s Fatal Tree, as being firmly in the internalism camp, an approach 
which considers the development of the law to be an autonomous field. Wiener argues 
scholars such as Hay to be pragmatists, viewing historical practices and developments as 
the result of ad-hoc acts of individuals with unforeseen consequences. Whilst not going so 
far as to argue pragmatists to be contextualists, Weiner suggests that viewing legal 
developments within the confines of an internal logic is necessary but not sufficient to 
provide a coherent explanation for such developments. 12 The most interesting element of 
Wiener’s dialectic and surrounding argument is his claim that both internalists and 
pragmatists ‘have tended to take for granted the sort of naïve positivism that has become 
increasingly implausible’.13 This reflects the concern that within the field of legal history, 
scholars persist in analysing and understanding changes in the law in terms of 
developments and progressions toward the rationalised and the modern. 
 
While assumptions of modernisation, understood in normative terms, are not unusual or in 
fact necessarily to be avoided when considering these developments, it is clear that we must 
recognise them if we are to justify reliance on particular sources such as Royal Commissions 
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and not others, such as anecdotal evidence reflected in the media or Parliament. Whilst it 
may seem attractive to rely more heavily upon sources situated within an institutional system 
seemingly working to achieve modernisation and progress, sources which ostensibly sit 
outside of such a system may unearth an alternative understanding of how reforming 
policies were passed. 
 
Herbert Butterfield posits that assumptions are often necessary when drawing inferences but 
stresses the importance of acknowledging that these conclusions are based upon such 
assumptions; whilst such recognition does not make the inferences drawn more reliable, it 
does provide some cautionary context within which to view the conclusions drawn.14 This is 
not a controversial argument, however its warnings are so often overlooked by paying 
disproportionately more attention to the evidence given to sources such as Royal 
Commissions rather than to other potentially illuminating sources. 
 
2 Professional Reactions to the Act 
Previous research concerning the legal profession’s response to the Act has focused more 
upon the reaction of the judiciary and evidence given to Parliament by two leading counsel, 
Charles Phillips and Charles Ewan Law.15 By considering the response of other practising 
members of the profession, an additional light might be shone upon the period leading to the 
1836 Act. In addition to widening the sources of evidence in understanding the response of 
other counsel, it is interesting to further consider one potential influence upon counsels’ 
reaction to the Act, namely the reputation of the criminal Bar. The reputation of the criminal 
Bar with the public, the media, Parliament and within the legal professional itself, was 
exceptionally negative. It is the effect of this reputation upon the reaction of criminal 
barristers to the reforms set down in the 1836 Act which warrants consideration. A better 
understanding of professional reactions to these reforms may be achieved if considered 
more as a cultural reaction to cultural opinion.   
 
Unfortunately there is a dearth of first-hand material relating to counsels’ reaction to the Act. 
There are little contemporary first-hand accounts of individual barristers’ response to the 
changes the Act introduced. For example, the Inns of Court have no record of any members 
writing on the subject of the Act or indeed, on changes within the felony trial around the time 
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of the Act.16 However, there are other sources such as the under-used Hansard reports 
which can be invoked to develop some understanding of the response by criminal counsel to 
the Act.  
 
Acknowledgment must be made to the methodological difficulties in writing any generalised 
theory which considers the Bar to be a unified body. However, by extending our 
understanding of the role of the Bar and individual barristers in response to the reforms 
under the Act, a more contextualised approach to these legal reforms may be established. In 
achieving this more nuanced understanding of major reforms such as the 1836 Act, a bridge 
between the traditional and prevailing Whig approaches and other contemporary research 
into the history of the legal profession itself might be constructed.  
 
A Fragmented Bar 
It would be a futile task to try to ascertain any coherent approach of the Bar in the 1830’s as 
there was no unified Bar. We cannot think of the Bar or the individual Inns in any cohesive 
sense such as that of trades union,17 and the Inns of Court played only a minor role in the 
regulation of counsel.18 There was yet to be any formal legal education as there existed no 
Bar examination and the delivery of law lectures within the University of London had only 
been introduced in the late 1820s. The Bar Counsel would not be established until 1894 and 
Circuits were essentially self-regulating and separate from each other with different circuit 
messes applying different codes of etiquette.  
 
There are multiple examples of variation in the rules of etiquette across the different circuits 
in the nineteenth century. Whilst most circuits were opposed to counsel accepting briefs 
without the previous mediation of a solicitor, this rule was not restricted by law even by 1850 
and the enforcement of the custom was very much reliant upon the etiquette of the particular 
circuit. Circuits played a more active and day-to-day role in the regulation and punishment of 
counsel, but again there is great variance between circuits. Some messes took to punishing 
breaches of etiquette through fining with wine, a system of penalisation whereby a member 
who had transgressed one of the rules of the circuit would be called out at a circuit dinner 
and made to purchase wine for some or all other members. 19  Other circuits enforced 
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preventative measures to breaches of professional etiquette such as the need for junior 
counsel to enter the assize town by foot in order to avoid touting for briefs whilst using public 
transport.20 It was widely feared that if barristers travelled to the host venue of the assize by 
public transport, they may have encountered friends or family of the accused or those 
wishing to bring a prosecution and may have taken this opportunity to offer their professional 
services. Arguably this suggests that those seeking to regulate professional ethics of counsel 
had little faith in individual counsel not to take advantage of circumstances if a brief was to 
be gained. However, it may also suggest that those organising individual assize trips were 
aware of the unpopular perception of counsel as prone to unscrupulously obtaining briefs 
and thus, thought it best that justice and professional integrity be seen to be done so as to 
avoid false accusations of breaches of professional ethics. 
 
In addition to the idiosyncrasies which divided each circuit, the Bar was internally divided by 
the strict hierarchy which formed the defining characteristic of the higher branches of the 
legal profession. David Lemmings notes the transition post-1600 from a Bar formed upon 
community and unifying ritual, to one of ‘self-consciously aggressive individualism’.21 The 
earlier Bar was perhaps not quite an idyllic brotherhood but in order to climb the professional 
ladder, barristers had to conform to the pattern of promotion defined by the profession itself. 
Many of the more successful members of the Bar either pursued careers in Parliament or 
were elected to or purchased positions such as Common Pleader.22 By the mid seventeenth 
century the judiciary, serjeants and practising barristers relied upon government service to 
improve their position23 and subsequently did not need to further the cohesion of the Bar by 
working within the parameters set out by members of the profession. Divisions within the Bar 
demonstrate the difficultly in trying to ascertain any general theory of the Bar as a unified 
entity speaking with one voice. In fact, the role of competition within the Bar for 
governmental promotion acted to break whatever fraternity previously existed amongst 
practising barristers. In light of this it is questionable whether the evidence of only two 
counsel to the Royal Commission, Charles Phillips and Charles Ewan Law, both from the 
same circuit, should be relied upon too heavily as a source for understanding the reaction of 
the Bar at that time. This concern would have been known to those leading the Commission. 
In light of this troublesome approach, an important question is raised: did the Royal 
Commission deliberately limit the evidence put before them when assessing the 
development of counsels’ role in the felony trial? Unfortunately the motivations of those 
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conducting the Royal Commission are outside the scope of this paper and rather, our 
question is what can be gleaned about the reaction of those practising at the Bar prior to the 
1836 Act? 
 
The Silent Majority?  
Undoubtedly there does not appear to have been a great outcry from the Bar in response to 
the Act. May suggests that the silence of the Bar and its members is evidence of the 
profession’s acquiescence to the introduction of jury speeches for defence counsel. She 
argues that because the Bar did not protest against the pre-reformed system, it can be 
concluded that the pre-1836 felony trial was supported by counsel. 24  Barristers often 
circumvented the strict rules of witness handling to address the jury or to posit a defence. 
Prior to 1836, this could well explain why there is a dearth of evidence surrounding 
barristers’ protestations against the unreformed system; counsel were not always suffering 
the disadvantages of having their role limited within the trial if judges were allowing covert 
addressing of the jury. This is only one potential explanation for the apparent silence from 
the profession at the Bar before the 1836 Act.  
 
A source of information which may shine light on the Bar’s reaction to the reforms 
surrounding the felony trial lies in Hansard. Between 1821 and 1836, reforms of the felony 
trial, particularly regarding the allowance of defence counsel to address the jury, were 
debated throughout Parliament at great length. The debates were detailed and often heated 
with multiple Members feeling compelled to speak on the subject. Little research into the 
particular members involved in the debate has been conducted and unfortunately this cannot 
be considered at length here. However, it is significant to note that Members of both Houses, 
and on either side of the debate, drew on anecdotal or hearsay evidence provided by 
practising members of the Bar to support their arguments. In many cases these references 
were to unnamed members of the profession and may have purely been rhetoric, but it does 
demonstrate either that members of the profession were vocal in their response to the 
reforms or, that politicians and the public of the time certainly felt that the profession was 
commenting upon the reforms.  
 
Studying the debates from 1821 to 1836, there is a clear shift in reference to the opinion of 
the legal profession. In 1826, the Attorney General, opposing the reforms, argued most of 
the profession to be against the development of the role of felony defence counsel. 25 
However, by 1836, Dr Lushington, advocate for the changes to the felony trial, argued that 
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members of the profession, including the Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench, supported 
the reforms.26 Obviously it is questionable whether either biased party could speak for the 
Bar as a whole. In June 1836, Lord Lyndhurst ably summarised the history of the Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act and admitted that historically the legal profession had been opposed to such 
measures introduced by the various Prisoners’ Counsels Bills. Lyndhurst went on to concede 
that the profession had recently grown more in favour of the lifting of felony trial 
restrictions.27 Unfortunately Lyndhurst does not give any reasons for this volte face, or rather, 
Hansard does not record whether he gave any explanation for the apparent change in the 
reaction of the profession. This may be evidence of Lyndhurst enlisting the support of the 
profession to support his arguments for the sake of rhetoric rather than as a definite 
statement of fact. However, it certainly bolsters the impression that members of the Bar were 
expressing their opinions, at least to politicians, if only in a personal capacity. 
 
3 Reflections upon Possible Reactions to the Act 
By focusing upon the impact of public distrust of the legal profession, some insight might be 
gained into why counsel were perhaps less vocal in their opinions regarding reform than 
might be expected. What is clear from Hansard and media records is that there was a very 
real fear that the felony trial could descend into a theatre for avaricious counsel to actively 
mislead the court for financial and reputational gain. Perhaps because of this concern, the 
professional Bar deliberately avoided a vocal response to the debates surrounding the felony 
trial for fear of further damaging their profession. 
 
It was apparent during the parliamentary debates surrounding the numerous Bills leading to 
the eventual passing of the 1836 Act that the effect of the legislation would be to develop the 
influence and role of counsel in the felony trial.28 The arguments against such an extension 
of the power of barristers were multiple and varied but suffice to say that from a practising 
barrister's perspective, such a change was likely to increase the amount of work and 
financial profit that counsel could expect.29 Prior to the Act, the role of defence counsel was 
limited to making legal submissions and examining witnesses.30 Before the development of 
more complex rules of evidence in the nineteenth century, there were few rigidly followed 
rules of evidence and so legal submissions were often limited to questioning the indictment 
against the prisoner. As indictments were only disclosed to the prisoner and his counsel 
upon reading at the beginning of the trial, counsel had little opportunity to challenge even 
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this. Langbein and Beattie have demonstrated that defence counsel acted beyond their remit 
in trials, using witness cross examination to put forward a narrative defence to the jury.31 
Counsel would frequently push the boundaries limiting their jurisdiction using questioning of 
witnesses to paint a clear picture of the defence to the jury without directly addressing 
them.32 Langbein argues that by 1836, the ‘accused speaks’ trial was essentially undermined, 
with counsel having far more influence within the trial than mere witness handling.33 It is not 
until 1836 that counsel would in fact have a right to address the jury. Following the Act, 
rather than officially being confined to witness handling and limited legal submissions, 
counsel would be able to deliver a defence to the jury in the form of a coherent and 
persuasive narrative. Subsequently, the official role of counsel within the trial, and 
assumedly prior to trial, would be developed. In light of these seemingly positive 
developments for the individual criminal barrister, an important question is why was the 
professional bar not more publically supportive of the Act?  
 
May argues this subversion of the rules does not reflect a desire by counsel to reform the 
restrictions.34 In this instance, counsels’ attempt to address the jury through witness handling 
does not necessarily reflect defence counsel protesting against the restrictions upon them 
but rather, they were trying to have the best of both worlds by maintaining a system which 
mostly protected prisoners from the death penalty whilst also allowing a better defence to be 
submitted through asides to the jury.  
 
Advocates should have supported the development of the adversarial trial predominantly 
because it was in their financial interests to do so.35 As addressed above, adversarialism 
allowed more scope for counsel to develop their role and probably to increase their fees. If 
counsel extended their influence in the trial, it follows that there was greater possibility of 
increasing their pecuniary reward as more of their time, as well as their importance would be 
required. As counsels’ role within both the trial and in preparations for trial became more time 
and resource consuming, it was to be expected that this increase in workload would yield 
more financial reward for the entire legal profession. However obvious the reasons may be 
for the practising criminal Bar to support the reforms of the Prisoners’ Counsel Act, there is 
evidence from politicians’ references in Hansard that some counsel did not support the 
reforms and there are a number of possible reasons why some did not. 
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Leading up to the passing of the Act, Parliament used Royal Commissions to receive 
evidence from barristers which might help them gauge the reaction of the profession to the 
debates leading up to the final, successful Bill. Such evidence should not be too heavily 
relied upon when concluding that the legal profession were against the Act. In a similar vein 
disproportionate focus upon the evidence given to the Commission by only two members of 
the Bar, Phillips and Law, and over-reliance on this evidence is problematic for three main 
reasons. First, it is questionable whether evidence to Royal Commissions, which is 
compelled by Parliament, can be accepted without qualification. Second, the credibility of the 
Bar’s two representatives ought to be questioned, particularly given the political sensitivity of 
the issue and the politicisation of the profession at this time.36 Lastly, by focusing solely upon 
this evidence, scholars may assume that these members represented the entire practising 
Bar. Again, this type of assumption is so often necessary but likewise, frequently misleading 
and artificial.  
 
4 The Effect of Paternalism: Counsel Opposition to the Act  
Whilst many barristers supported the development of an adversarial system, they did not 
necessarily support the Prisoners’ Counsel Act itself. Members of the Bar such as William 
Garrow opposed such reforms on paternalistic grounds.37 It was felt that with the various 
penal codes in force at the time which created so many capital crimes, the only hope 
prisoners had was to fall upon the mercy of the court. To a large extent this approach worked 
very well and all parties to the felony trial, including prosecuting counsel, acted to save the 
pitiful accused in many cases.38 Indictments were deliberately drafted to reduce felonies to 
misdemeanours, guilty pleas were rarely accepted (should a prisoner plead guilty to a felony 
the entire court would try to persuade him to plead not guilty39) and in the majority of cases 
prosecuting counsel were measured and reserved in their submissions.40 If there were any 
procedural errors made by the prosecution such as minor errors on indictments, the judge 
would, in most cases, acquit the prisoner immediately.41 Such measures greatly reduced the 
number of prisoners actually executed and many felt that without these measures, the death 
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toll would be unpalatable.42 This is not necessarily to say that the profession were altruistic in 
any sense, but were the Bloody Code to be strictly enforced without the balancing effect of 
customs such as pious perjury, the number of executions would rise to a previously 
unimaginable figure.43  By the 1830s the entire court process looked increasingly like a 
filtering system consisting of several safeguards to prevent execution.44 As alternatives to 
execution such as the increased use of transportation were introduced, the use of pious 
perjury became less necessary and juries were more inclined to convict on the original 
indictment45  rather than altering the facts of the case in order to reduce the maximum 
sentence below that of death. 
 
Many people, both MPs and Lords, as well as some publications, argued the extended use 
of counsel would have a negative effect for the prisoneras the aforementioned safeguards 
and leniency shown to the prisoner would be withdrawn. 46 This was undoubtedly a genuine 
fear for many of those opposing the Act but we should be careful not to conclude that 
opponents to the Act were paternalistic whereas proponents of the Act were more concerned 
with the truth finding benefits the reform would bring.47 
 
May’s work often appears to view paternalism as being in opposition to liberalism and 
creates a dichotomy between the two. Paternalism is constructed in terms which are 
opposed to liberalism; as paternalism against individual responsibility. This approach to 
paternalism is too simplistic and does not allow for analysis of the reforms outside of the 
Whig-Tory dichotomy. It is misleading to understand the development of the reforms as being 
driven by liberal, progressive Whigs and railed against by paternalistic Tories. It could be 
accepted that Charles Ewan Law’s opposition to the reforms as being due to his political 
views in that Law was a committed Tory and subsequently was more inclined to support the 
paternalistic approach of his party and oppose the Act.48 However, Phillips’ opposition to the 
Bills is more surprising because Phillips was a Whig. Paternalism infiltrated the debate 
surrounding the reforms on both sides with Phillips, opposing the reforms, making clear 
references to the need to protect the prisoner from the full force of the Bloody Code. We 
must be careful not to presuppose Phillips’ motivations for opposing the reforms but his 
being a Whig, along with his evidence to the Royal Commission, would suggest some 
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consideration for the prisoner.49 Phillips’ opposition to the reforms astonished some of his 
friends such as Lord Brougham, champion of the Act.50 This surprise was because Whigs of 
the day may have initially believed all Whigs to support such reform but perhaps Brougham 
did not appreciate the impact paternalist thinking had on the issue. Moreover, understanding 
paternalism as a coherent underlying cause behind any issue of legal or social reform is 
troublesome as such an approach ignores the divisions within paternalism itself. For 
example, it has been suggested that the increased popularity of paternalism from the end of 
the eighteenth century was in reaction to the growth of liberalism.51 Ostensibly this argument 
lends itself to the dichotomy between old world reactionary Toryism and the modernising 
force of liberalism but with regard to the 1836 Act, those supporting or opposing the reforms 
do not always fit into this model. As aforementioned, there were humanitarian paternalists, 
arguably such as Phillips, who were concerned with the harsh realities the prisoner may find 
himself in were the safeguards within the felony trial removed. Another Whig Member of 
Parliament who supported the Act was James Scarlett who might be described as a 
confused paternalist. Scarlett was a Whig in that he supported laissez-faire principles but he 
was also a Malthusian, an approach which lamented the decline of paternalism.52 Scarlett is 
highly demonstrative of the potential for inconsistency in politicians’ approaches to societal 
responsibility and human nature itself. Moreover, Scarlett is a prime example of why we must 
be very careful not to assume that paternalist thinking was somehow opposed to the reforms.  
 
5 The Effect of Conservatism: Counsel Opposition to the Act 
A second reason for the Bar’s resistance to reform may be derived from the very character of 
the profession itself. The Bar and the legal profession as a whole are not recognized for 
embracing radical change and this was no less the case in the early nineteenth century. 
Members of the profession commenting around the time of the 1836 Act refer to the Bar's 
‘repugnance to change long-established rules’.53  This is not a useful argument in itself 
tending to lead to a dead end rather than any useful conclusion. The claim that all barristers 
abhorred change is not only too sweeping a statement but also fails to consider motives 
behind individual members of the profession. However, there may be some weight to the 
argument that law reform was traditionally seen as the preserve of lawyers and the 
encroachment of Parliament upon such reforms may have been met with some resistance 
by the profession.  
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Much has been made of the 40 years of ‘progressive rationalisation’ instigated by the coming 
to power of the Whigs in the 1820s. 54  The first half of the nineteenth century was 
unquestionably a period of great reform and change affecting most aspects of social and 
political life. For a profession such as the Bar, ostensibly both politically and socially 
conservative in outlook, such dramatic alterations to the fabric of society would 
understandably be resisted. Again we find ourselves returning to the narrow argument of 
professional conservatism but this seemingly limiting argument can be interpreted in a 
potentially illuminating way. If it were indeed the case that the legal profession saw itself as 
the true and justified reforming force of the law, then the measures surrounding the felony 
trial may have been resented by the profession which believed itself to have the monopoly of 
law reform. Whilst many of the MPs involved in the introduction of the Bills preceding the Act 
were at least members of the Inns, if not having previously been practising barristers, it is not 
unlikely that those still in practice may have resented such radical changes to their daily 
practice being driven solely by politicians. 
 
One explanation for the conservatism of the Bar may be found in the perceived threat to the 
continued existence of the profession. Pue couches understanding of counsels’ refusal to be 
more involved in reform in terms of the survival skills of the Benchers of the Inns of Courts;55 
the Bar did not wish to upset the political or economic status quo.56 Like Phillips and Laws, 
Benchers’ promotion to legal office relied upon the grace and favour of political benefactors. 
It would be imprudent for the ambitious member of the Bar to become politically radical 
thereby potentially risking alienating themselves from the politically powerful of the day.  
 
There has been some discussion as to the role of party politics upon the behaviour of the 
Bar throughout the nineteenth century. As aforementioned, it is inadvisable to try to 
understand the Bar during this period as a unified organisation.57 However, the English 
barrister had the opportunity to be ‘involved in all aspects of the construction of a liberal 
polity in the nineteenth, as in the eighteenth, century’.58  The Courvoisier trial, in which 
Phillips’ career was deeply damaged by later claims that he deliberately misled the court 
knowing the prisoner, Courvoisier, to be guilty, are illustrative of this. Pue’s claim that 
Courvoisier forwarded the liberal cause illustrates the need to consider barristers’ political 
affiliations and approaches in their response to developments within the trial. No large 
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section of the Bar had any political affiliations per se and did not appear to behave in any 
consistent way politically.59 Nonetheless, his previous claim that members of the Bar were 
pursuing methods designed to introduce liberalism into the trial, requires some reflection. If it 
is the case that some members of the Bar were in fact promoting change within the trial, this 
weakens the common argument that the Bar was a conservative profession railing against 
parliamentary driven reform of the criminal justice system as a whole and further strengthens 
the perception of a disjointed and fragmented Bar.  
 
It is arguable whether some members of the Bar were indeed taking steps to liberalise the 
felony trial. Given the lack of any other regulatory body, it is true that the Inns did not play as 
significant a role in the regulation of the Bar as may have been expected. This does not 
definitively prove that there was no regulation of individual barrister’s behaviour by the 
profession. There are limited examples of more liberal or radical members of the Bar in the 
first half of the nineteenth century but these members, such as Thomas Erskine, did not 
remain in the profession for long which may suggest that, amongst other reasons, the Bar 
was not an attractive environment for progressive individuals. There are also a number of 
examples of Benchers who were happy to repress the careers of junior counsel who stepped 
outside of the status quo. What these examples demonstrate is that whilst it may not have 
been the concerted effort of the Inns to formally enforce conservativism, there may have 
been alternative systems of control at play within the profession (such as the aforementioned 
controls within the circuits) which repressed any liberal tendencies. There are several 
examples of individuals being refused promotion from junior counsel or entrance to the Inns 
of Courts during the first half of the nineteenth century which prompted more progressive 
counsel such as Daniel O’Connell to protest against such obvious repression.60 One of the 
most controversial being that of D.W. Harvey in 1821, in which the House of Commons 
intervened against the Inn’s decision. 61  Even so, this repression, assuming it was a 
concerted practice to restrain the more liberal at the Bar, was not wholly successful as 
demonstrated by the very existence of progressive counsel such as O’Connell.62  
 
6 Advocacy, Parliament and the Media: Public and Political Distrust 
A third, and more complex reason for the lack of universal support for the reforms, may lie in 
the perception of the Bar by the public. The nineteenth century criminal barrister was not a 
well-paid or well-respected figure. On all circuits, but more so within the Central Criminal 
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Court, criminal barristers were often the younger members of the Bar, cutting their teeth 
within the criminal courts for the shortest time possible before escaping to the better paid 
and better respected civil and chancery courts. The criminal barrister in particular was 
contemptible even to his fellow members of the Bar: ‘An Old Bailey Practitioner is a by-word 
for disgrace and infamy.’63 Yet a disdain for advocates was by no means limited to the 
criminal bar and moreover, the morality of barristers has long been questioned by the public. 
There is ample evidence of this not only during the period of the Prisoners’ Counsel debates 
but throughout the nineteenth century. There are high profile examples of the villainy of legal 
advocates in Victorian literature and there are also examples in the media of the time of 
public mistrust and hatred of counsel, and in fact of the felony trial in general. A common 
portrayal of the advocate in nineteenth century literature was that of being the criminal 
himself as though damned by association. Well known examples can be found in Charles 
Dickens’ Bleak House, George Elliot’s Felix Holt and more subtly in William Makepeace 
Thackeray’s Vanity Fair in which lawyers were given the names of famous Victorian 
criminals.64  
 
Representations of counsel which have not been extensively explored by those writing in this 
field are again to be found in the Parliamentary debates of the period. During the second 
reading of the Prisoners' Defence by Counsel Bill, O'Connell, who was the Member of 
Parliament for Dublin, made very clear accusations against the evidence provided to the 
committee by members of the Bar, in particular Charles Phillips.65 O’Connell went so far as 
to question the motives of Phillips in providing his evidence, implying Phillips to be distracted 
by pecuniary or political concerns. The following month, Colonel Perceval replied to 
O’Connell’s accusation and strongly criticised him for charging Charles Phillips with giving 
false evidence to the Committee.66 What then ensued was a ferocious argument between 
O’Connell and Perceval which greatly shocked the House and which demonstrates how 
seriously O’Connell’s accusation was taken by both Phillips and Perceval. What is of 
particular interest is that when O’Connell made the accusation, no member of the House 
present disputed or corrected his accusation and there was no public response to the charge. 
Colonel Perceval only complained of the slur two weeks later and upon receiving a letter 
from Phillips requesting that his friend, Perceval, vindicate him. This clearly reflects that 
libellous criticism of counsel provoked no spontaneous reaction within Parliament or in public 
which further suggests an attitude to the professional Bar which was little short of contempt. 
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Such a lack of complaint reflects how the act of claiming one of the most senior members of 
the Bar to be in the pocket of the government seemed to be an entirely reasonable 
statement to both Parliament and public alike. 
 
More generally, a major concern voiced in Parliament in response to the reforms was the 
assumption that should defence counsel be allowed to speak on the prisoner’s behalf, the 
felony trial would become a verbal gladiatorial arena. This criticism was raised dozens of 
times between 1821 and 1836 and by different members of both the Commons and the 
Lords. As one Member stated, the reforms would: ‘change the sober floor of a court of justice 
into an arena for two ingenious combatants to display their strength and agility in; the stake 
for which they played being nothing less than the life of a man’.67 The replacement of a trial, 
which many believed to elicit the truth through the direct testimony of the accused, with a 
system allowing for the manipulation of this testimony by counsel, was a worrying prospect 
for those who believed representation to undermine the quality of the evidence put before 
the court.  
 
Throughout the Parliamentary debates of this period reference is often made to the public’s 
displeasure with the use of counsel. In 1824, even the greatest proponent of the reforms, 
George Lamb, admitted that public satisfaction with trials would be improved if there was no 
counsel at all, prosecuting or defending.68 The profession as a whole withstood the ravages 
of public opinion.69 The profession feared that by setting itself against public opinion, the Bar 
would face questions as to the overall utility of advocates. Was it strictly necessary to have 
separate legal representatives merely for witness handling?70 Moreover, older members of 
the Bar had already witnessed a crisis of unpopularity in the late 1800s and were aware of 
the difficulties this could pose. In a time of transition of professions, a serious reflection as to 
the utility of separate advocates could have proved fatal to the Bar. During the early 
nineteenth century there was little regulation of the profession and there was disagreement 
between the Inns with regard to the education or qualification process for new barristers.71 It 
may not have been impossible for the Bar to be subsumed into a general legal profession 
thereby disposing of the unpopular and expensive solicitor/advocate distinction. This 
eventuality may appear unlikely but it must be remembered that the profession did later 
dramatically alter through such measures as dissolving the Serjeants’ Inn and through the 
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creation of the Bar Council in 1894.72 Additionally, the Bar as a profession was not equipped 
to defend itself against public criticism especially in light of the focus upon tradition which 
permeated not only everything the profession did but more importantly, the rationale for the 
majority of the customs of the Bar if not the Bar itself. 73  In an age of self-conscious 
rationalisation, an unpopular profession reliant on tradition as a rationale for its existence, 
was in a precarious position. Whilst it is true that the Bar as a profession and the Inns of 
Court felt somewhat untouchable in comparison with the development of other professions in 
the nineteenth century,74 public opinion was still relevant, especially with regard to the 1836 
Act.  
 
Previous research surrounding the Act would suggest that the Bills leading to the Prisoners’ 
Counsel Act received little public attention in the 1820s beyond a widely referenced article by 
Sidney Smith in the Edinburgh Review.75 This is by no means the case as there are reports 
of the progress of the reforms throughout the media from 1824.76 It is apparent though, that 
there was an increase of interest in counsel for the defence in the 1830s.77 One illustrative 
example can be found in the Quarterly Review in 1836, in which the Prisoners’ Counsel Bill 
attracted a great deal of public attention, far more than any other legal consideration.78 The 
public recognised that the reforms contained within the Bill would have wide-reaching 
implications and many publications and journals keenly followed the reforms through 
Parliament. More generally, the public echoed the concerns raised in Parliament surrounding 
the nature of barristers and the Bar. During the debates concerning the reforms to the felony 
trial, members of the public wrote to various publications complaining of the behaviour of 
counsel and giving personal examples of mistreatment at the hands of barristers.79  
 
Many publications also mirrored the language used by parliamentary opponents to the 
reforms and the questioning of the honesty and integrity of barristers themselves. One 
example of this can be found in the 1826 publication of The Age, in which the fear of 
advocacy barring discovery of the truth was strongly expressed: ‘We would have the simple 
and clear course of truth polluted and turned away by the mixture of elaborate speech-
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making and the jury be lead, not by the fact, but by their passions’.80 Other publications went 
so far as to attack individual counsel, surprisingly including Charles Phillips who was against 
the reform: ‘An experienced counsel, like Charles Phillips, or Mr Adolphus, for instance, will 
be so much better able to prove a rogue to be an honest man than could the said rogue 
himself’.81 There is no evidence of Phillips standing out as the figurehead of public distain for 
lawyers prior to the Courvoisier trial in 1840 and thus, it might be supposed that such attacks 
reflect a more general distrust of wily counsel and the abuses they might render onto 
criminal justice.  
 
Public opinion and Parliamentary pressure was to prove influential upon the Bar in later 
years through such reforms as the Bar qualifying exam in 1872.82 Whilst the development of 
the Bar as a profession initially resisted parliamentary and public pressure, the nineteenth 
century saw the Bar increasingly responding to outside influence83.  
 
An illustrative depiction of public opinion regarding advocates is given in a speech made by 
John Stuart Mill in 1827 entitled ‘The Influence of Lawyers’ Mill argued the influence of 
lawyers to be ‘pernicious to morals, jurisprudence and government’, that lawyers ‘live by 
roguery’ and that they be immoral whatever their argument or whoever they represent even 
when on the side of justice. Evidently barristers are predominantly motivated by money and 
will happily stand in the way of justice for their own gains: ‘But without dwelling upon the 
pecuniary advantages which lawyers derive from all vices of the law, sufficient reason for 
their constant opposition to all improvement in it is to be found in… professional narrowness 
of mind…’ 84  
 
Conclusion 
Current literature surrounding the development of the felony trial in the nineteenth century 
has done much to develop our understanding of the 1836 reforms and to the development of 
the adversarial system itself. However, further attention is warranted with regard to the 
reaction of the professional Bar to the introduction of the Act. This paper has pursued a 
different perspective by further regarding the role of the opinion of individual counsel and the 
perception of the Bar as a profession and the impact this may have had on trial development. 
Moreover, it has been questioned why particular groups or individuals reacted to these 
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reforms in the way they did. By considering the responses and actions of those expected to 
implement the final decisions of criminal procedure reform, this approach has provide further 
exploration of the context in which Parliament solidified the rights of prisoners within the 
felony trial. 
 
Two main explanations for the apparent silence of the Bar in response to such a significant 
piece of legislation have emerged. Firstly, the disparate nature of the Bar prohibited any 
united response to trial changes and secondly, the widespread distrust for and unpopularity 
of the Bar understandably prevented individual barristers from raising their heads above the 
parapet during such a time of upheaval. While it is true that there is little evidence of counsel 
speaking directly on the changes brought about by the Act, it is not the case that such 
silence suggests acquiescence with the changes. This is particularly so due to the apparent 
silence during the decade of discussion leading to the 1836 Act itself. An acquiescence 
explanation makes little sense in light of this ongoing silence as the reforms could have been 
successful or have failed and yet, counsel did not raise a public argument for either side. A 
more plausible explanation is that individual barristers were less likely to speak publically on 
the reforms without a more unified Bar supporting them and even if an individual barrister did 
want to make a public statement regarding the trial reforms, the profession’s unpopularity 
rendered any voicing of counsel opinion to be inadvisable. This better understanding of the 
reaction of counsel to this particular trial reform not only provides further illustration of the 
climate within which the Act was passed but also, public and political perceptions of the Bar 
in the early and mid-nineteenth century, how such perceptions impacted on the behaviour of 
counsel and the consequences that a disjointed Bar had on the ability of the profession to 
play a role in the development of the felony trial.  
 
